Chelsea have conceded 12 goals in their first five Premier League matches, the worst defensive record in the division, and are still waiting for their first clean sheet under Xabi Alonso.
The 3-0 defeat by Brentford was the latest setback and extended Chelsea’s run without a Premier League clean sheet to more than 20 matches. Their defensive difficulties have raised questions over Alonso’s system, the absence of key players and the number of costly individual mistakes being made.
Alonso arrived at Stamford Bridge with a reputation for control, structure and sophisticated positional football. Chelsea have shown some of the attacking ambition associated with the former Bayer Leverkusen manager, but their defending has lacked the same organisation.
Chelsea’s aggressive defensive line and advanced wing-backs place considerable responsibility on midfielders to protect the spaces left when possession is lost. However, blaming the system alone would be too simple.
Alonso’s unbeaten Bayer Leverkusen side conceded only 24 goals in 34 Bundesliga matches in 2023-24, an average of about 0.7 per game and a club record. His early work at Real Madrid also suggested a coach focused on defensive control. In the early part of the 2025-26 campaign, Madrid reduced the counter-attacks they faced from 1.47 per match the previous season to 0.83, while their PPDA improved from 12.1 to 10.8 and they won possession more often near the opposition penalty area.
Chelsea’s current problems appear to stem from a combination of missing players, an incomplete tactical structure and repeated errors.
Caicedo absence affects Chelsea’s defensive structure
Moises Caicedo has not yet made a Premier League start, apart from the 22 minutes he played as a substitute in the 4-3 victory over Brighton after returning from injury. His absence was particularly noticeable against Brentford, when Jordan Henderson started in midfield alongside Valentin Barco.
Caicedo’s importance goes beyond his role as a defensive midfielder. In Alonso’s system, the deepest midfielder is central to the “rest defence” – the players positioned behind the ball while Chelsea attack. When wing-backs move forward and Chelsea commit numbers near the opposition penalty area, someone must block the first pass of a counter-attack.
Caicedo is suited to that task because he reads danger, covers ground quickly, wins second balls and can defend both centrally and towards the touchline. His positioning also allows the defenders behind him to remain compact instead of being pulled into midfield.
Without that protection, a centre-back may have to step forward to confront an advancing midfielder. Another defender then moves across, leaving the far side exposed. The absence of one player can consequently alter the responsibilities of four or five others.
Caicedo’s return would not automatically solve Chelsea’s problems, but it could make an aggressive side more secure during transitions.
Marco Palestra may be another significant absence. The Italian had only just begun his competitive Chelsea career before injury, but he impressed during pre-season and was used on both flanks. After the 3-0 win against AC Milan, Alonso praised his impact, adaptability and hunger, saying the youngster was getting “better and better”.
Alonso’s wing-backs are expected to provide width, move high up the pitch, press and recover quickly when possession changes hands. Palestra appeared capable of fulfilling those demands. If a wing-back is slow to recover, the right centre-back may be dragged towards the touchline, the central defender shifts across and space opens on the far side for a late runner. Morgan Rogers’ recovery run almost led to a goal in one such situation.
Palestra’s absence therefore removes more than a promising squad player; it deprives Alonso of someone who appeared particularly suited to one of his system’s most demanding positions.
Defensive issues extend beyond injuries
Chelsea have conceded at least twice in each of Alonso’s first five Premier League matches. Hull City scored twice at Stamford Bridge, Arsenal scored twice and Brentford scored three. Even the victories carried warning signs, making it impossible to attribute the problems entirely to Caicedo and Palestra.
Alonso’s football depends on precise relationships. A wing-back can attack because a midfielder covers, while a centre-back can step forward because another defender protects the space behind him. The press also requires the forwards and midfield to move together.
If Chelsea’s forwards press but the midfield hesitates, the opposition midfielder can turn and advance. The centre-backs must then choose between stepping out and exposing space behind them or staying deep and allowing the ball-carrier to progress. What appears to be a defensive error several seconds later may have begun when Chelsea’s first two defensive lines became disconnected.
That is an issue Alonso must address on the training ground. His Leverkusen side showed that his philosophy does not require defensive vulnerability. Granit Xhaka provided positional intelligence, Exequiel Palacios offered mobility, and the high positioning of Jeremie Frimpong and Alejandro Grimaldo was protected by a strong structure behind the ball.
Chelsea currently appear to have retained the attacking ambition without consistently reproducing the defensive insurance. Their matches become stretched, leaving a young and developing defence to deal with situations Alonso’s system is intended to prevent.
Individual errors have also played a major role. Jorrel Hato made an error during Hull City’s 2-2 draw at Stamford Bridge, while Chelsea were repeatedly punished by Brentford for failing to win first contacts, track runners and defend the far post.
They have conceded four goals from set pieces in five Premier League matches. Since the beginning of last season, Chelsea have allowed 23 goals from set-piece situations, joint-worst among Premier League clubs during that period. Set pieces cannot be explained by open-play transitions or rest defence: players know where the ball is coming from and which opponents they must track.
Brentford said they deliberately targeted Chelsea’s back-post area after identifying a weakness. Levi Colwill admitted Chelsea had been “bullied” at times – a description that points to concentration, communication and physical contests as much as tactical complexity.
The problems are also psychological. Chelsea’s defensive structure deteriorated after Brentford scored, with the hosts adding two more goals. Alonso questioned whether his players could maintain their competitive level throughout a full match.
The team has often become more open when behind. More players move forward, distances increase and another transition follows. A 1-0 deficit becomes 2-0, and at Brentford it became three.
Alonso must therefore solve both a tactical and a game-management problem. Chelsea’s spacing is inconsistent, their pressing can become disconnected and their defensive transitions are too easy to exploit. Yet his record at Leverkusen and Real Madrid suggests the philosophy itself is not inherently flawed.
Caicedo’s return and Palestra’s recovery may provide important evidence. If Chelsea become more compact with both available, their difficult opening could be viewed as the early installation phase of a new system missing two key components.
For now, Chelsea’s defence does not look doomed. It looks unfinished – and the Premier League offers little time to complete the work.
